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Abstract Supply chain coordination is enabled by adequately designed contracts
so that decision making by multiple actors avoids efficiency losses in the supply
chain. From the literature it is known that in newsvendor-type settings with random
demand and deterministic supply the activities in supply chains can be coordinated
by sophisticated contracts while the simple wholesale price contract fails to achieve
coordination due to the double marginalization effect. Advanced contracts are
typically characterized by risk sharing mechanisms between the actors, which have
the potential to coordinate the supply chain. Regarding the opposite setting with
random supply and deterministic demand, literature offers a considerably smaller
spectrum of solution schemes. While contract types for the well-known stochasti-
cally proportional yield have been analyzed under different settings, other yield
distributions have not received much attention in the literature so far. However,
practice shows that yield types strongly depend on the industry and the production
process that is considered. As consequence, they can deviate very much from the
specific case of a stochastically proportional yield. This paper analyzes a buyer–
supplier supply chain in a random yield, deterministic demand setting with pro-
duction yield of a binomial type. It is shown how under binomially distributed
yields risk sharing contracts can be used to coordinate buyer’s ordering and sup-
plier’s production decision. Both parties are exposed to risks of overproduction and
under-delivery. In contrast to settings with stochastically proportional yield, how-
ever, the impact of yield uncertainty can be quite different in the binomial yield
case. Under binomial yield, the output uncertainty decreases with larger production
quantities while it is independent from lot sizes under stochastically proportional
yield. Consequently, the results from previous contract analyses on other yield types
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may not hold any longer. The current analytical study reveals that, like under
stochastically proportional yield, coordination is impeded by double marginalization
if a simple wholesale price contract is applied. However, more sophisticated con-
tracts which penalize or reward the supplier can change the risk distribution so that
supply chain coordination is possible also under binomial yield. In this context,
many contract properties from planning under stochastically proportional yield
carry over. Nevertheless, numerical examples reveal that a misspecification of the
yield type can considerably downgrade the extent of supply chain coordination.
Keywords Supply chain coordination  Contracts  Binomial yield  Risk
sharing
1 Introduction
Uncertainties are widely spread in supply chains with demand and supply
uncertainties being the most common types. Regarding the supply side, business
risks primarily result from yield uncertainty which is typical for a variety of
business sectors. It frequently occurs in the agricultural sector or in the chemical,
electronic and mechanical manufacturing industries (see Gurnani et al. 2000; Jones
et al. 2001; Kazaz 2004; Nahmias 2009). Here, random supply can appear due to
different reasons such as weather conditions, production process risks or imperfect
input material. In a supply chain context, yield or supply randomness obviously
influences the risk position of the actors and, therefore, has an effect on the buyer–
supplier relationship in a supply chain. The question that arises is to what extent
random yields affect the decisions of the single supply chain actors and the
performance of the whole supply chain. In this study, we limit ourselves to a
problem setting with deterministic demand. This is to focus the risk analysis of
contracting on the random yield aspect which is of practical relevance for
production planning in some industries (see Bassok et al. 2002). Except for papers
that address disruption risks (e.g., Asian 2014; Hou et al. 2010), all contributions in
the field of contract analysis under yield randomness restrict to situations where the
yield type is characterized by stochastically proportional random yields. This also
holds for a prior work of Inderfurth and Clemens (2014) which considers the
coordination properties of various risk-sharing contracts under this type of yield
randomness.
The preference for the assumption of stochastically proportional yield is mainly
due to the fact that this yield type is relatively easy to handle analytically in standard
yield models where only a single production run per period is used for demand
fulfillment. In this model context, already the basic analytical studies by Gerchak
et al. (1988) and Henig and Gerchak (1990) which investigate the optimal policy
structure in a centralized supply chain setting with random yield environment refer
to the stochastically proportional yield type. In practice, this form of production
yield is only observed if yield losses are caused by an external effect that has a joint
impact on a complete production batch so that the yield of each unit in the batch is
perfectly correlated. Often, however, other yield types are found (see Yano and Lee
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1995) which are of greater practical relevance and demand for specific consideration
in decision making and contract analysis. Literature contributions which refer to a
larger variety of yield models concentrate on planning situations where multiple
production lots within a single period can be released [see (Grosfeld-Nir and
Gerchak 2004) for an overview]. These studies, however, only address centralized
decision making problems.
In our study, we focus on problems with a single production run and deviate from
the assumption of stochastically proportional yield. Instead, we study a framework
with binomially distributed yield which is characterized by a zero yield correlation
of units within a production batch. This yield property is observed if failures in
manufacturing operations or if material defectives occur independently in a
production process. Since the properties of stochastically proportional and binomial
yield are contrary (perfect vs. zero yield correlation), it is by no means
straightforward if the coordination properties of contracts hold for both yield types
in the same way. This paper is the first one that addresses the analysis of
coordination by contracts under binomial yield conditions and investigates to which
extent the results for stochastically proportional yields in Inderfurth and Clemens
(2014) carry over to a situation where yields are binomially distributed.
In this context, the main purpose of this paper is to study how contracts can be
used to diminish profit losses which are driven by uncoordinated behavior.
Therefore, three different contracts are applied and analyzed regarding their
coordination ability, namely the simple wholesale price contract, a reward contract
[overproduction risk-sharing contract, first introduced by He and Zhang (2008)] and
a penalty contract (compare Gurnani and Gerchak 2007). Comparable to the
newsvendor setting with stochastic demand but reliable supply, the double
marginalization effect of the wholesale price contract is found in our setting. Both
advanced contract types can be shown to facilitate supply chain coordination if
contract parameters are chosen appropriately.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 the supply chain model
and the yield distribution are introduced. In part 3 the centralized supply chain is
analyzed in a binomial yield setting to generate a benchmark for decisions and
objective values in the following contract analyses. Section 4 describes three
contract designs, namely the wholesale price contract, the overproduction risk
sharing contract, and the penalty contract and analyzes them with respect to their
supply chain coordination potential. Section 5 summarizes main results, highlights
problems caused by yield misspecification and suggests aspects of further research.
2 Model and assumptions
This paper considers a basic single-period interaction within a serial supply chain
with one buyer (indicated by B) and one supplier (indicated by S). It is assumed that
all cost, price, and yield information is common knowledge. In contrast to that,
deterministic end-customer demand is not common knowledge but only known to
the buyer. As the supplier decision is totally independent from end-customer
demand, this is a reasonable assumption. This setting connects to the field of
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contracting in a principal-agent context with information asymmetry [see (Corbett
and Tang 1999) or (Burnetas et al. 2007)] where the principal (buyer) is better
informed than the agent (supplier). Nevertheless, this property has no effect on the
agent’s profit because it is not a direct function of the principal’s information on
demand (compare Maskin and Tirole 1990). The supply chain and the course of
interaction (explained below) are depicted in Fig. 1.
Assume the above two-member supply chain (indexed by SC). End-customer
demand is denoted by D. The buyer orders from the supplier an amount of X units.
The production process of the supplier, however, underlies risks which lead to
random production yields, i.e., although the production input is fixed the output
quantity in a specific production run is uncertain. The supplier can, due to
production lead times, realize only a single production run.
In the following, production yield is denoted by YðQÞ where Q is the production
input chosen by the supplier. The quantity delivered to the buyer is the minimum of
order quantity and production output. Hence, the supplier faces the risk of losing
sales in case of too low production yield. However, it is a reasonable assumption
that, given a simple wholesale price contract, the supplier is not further penalized (in
addition to losing potential revenue) if end-customer demand cannot be satisfied due
to under-delivery. In typical business transactions the supplying side is usually
measured in terms of its ability to deliver to the buyer and not to the end customer.
As the mechanism to satisfy end-customer demand is not in the control of the
supplier, she cannot be held responsible for potential sales losses. However, both
actors face the risk of lost sales because under-delivery by the supplier can cause
unsatisfied demand at the buyer as stated above. Consequently, both parties may
have incentives to inflate demand (from the buyer’s perspective) or order quantity
(from the supplier’s perspective) to account for the yield risk and avoid lost sales. In
case production output is larger than order quantity, excess units are worthless and
cannot generate any revenue even though they incurred production cost. Sales at the
buyer are the minimum of delivery quantity and end-customer demand. If the
buyer’s order and delivery quantity exceed demand, excess units are also of no
value and cannot be turned into revenues.
Production yields are assumed to be binomially distributed, i.e., a unit turns out
‘good’ (or usable) with success probability h (0 h 1) and it is unusable with
counter probability 1 h:
Fig. 1 Serial supply chain and course of interaction
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Thus, the probabilities for possible yields from a production batch Q are given by
Pr Y Qð Þ ¼ kf g ¼ Q
k
 
 hk 1 hð ÞQk 8 k ¼ 0; 1; . . .;Q
Mean production yield amounts to
lYðQÞ ¼ h  Q ð1Þ
with a standard deviation of
rYðQÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h  ð1 hÞ  Q
p
ð2Þ
Note that the coefficient of variation ðrYðQÞ
.
lYðQÞÞ decreases as the input quantity
grows, i.e., the risk diminishes with increasing production quantity. This is different
from a situation with stochastically proportional yield where production yield is a
random fraction of production input and neither mean nor variance of the yield rate
depends on the batch size. Thus, a reasonable conjecture is that under binomially
distributed yields, the risk allocation between the single actors is different from that
under stochastically proportional yields. Hence, contract schemes with different risk-
sharing mechanisms may perform differently when the lot size influences the
‘‘amount of risk’’ in the supply chain and may change the proposed contract types’
coordination efficiency. The subsequent analyses will shed light on this issue.
For large values of demand (like for most consumer goods) and the respective
production quantity, i.e., if the sample of the binomial distribution is sufficiently large,
according to the De Moivre–Laplace theorem1 the binomial distribution can be
approximated through a normal distribution. This approximation will be used in the
sequel with parameters which are fitted according to (1) and (2).2 This deviation from the
exact binomial distribution is motivated by the fact that it facilitates the contract analysis
by modeling the decision problem with continuous instead of discrete variables so that
general analytic results with closed-form expressions can be derived. Furthermore, the
respective numerical results are very close to optimal under fairly high demand levels.
Further notation is as follows:
c Production cost (per unit input)
w Wholesale price (per unit)
p Retail price (per unit)
fS ð Þ pdf of standard normal distribution
FS ð Þ cdf of standard normal distribution
fYðQÞ ð Þ pdf of random variable YðQÞ (yield)
FYðQÞ ð Þ cdf of random variable YðQÞ (yield)
The problem which arises is how to determine quantities for ordering on the
one hand (by the buyer) and choosing a production input quantity on the other
hand (by the supplier) given the risks mentioned above. The general underlying
1 Compare Feller (1968) pp. 174 ff.
2 The condition which justifies the use of the Normal distribution is the following: Q  h  1 hð Þ[ 5 for
0:1 h 0:9 (compare Evans et al. 2000 p. 45).
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assumption in this analysis is that profitability of the business for both parties is
assured, i.e., the retail price p exceeds the wholesale price w which in turn
exceeds the expected production cost c=h, i.e., p[w[ c=h. As is common in the
field of contract analysis, the behavior of the actors in a supply chain is
investigated under the assumption that decentralized decision making can be
modeled as a Stackelberg game. Before we come to the respective analyses, first
the optimal decisions will be evaluated for a centralized supply chain setting to
provide a benchmark solution.3
3 Analysis for a centralized supply chain
Under centralized decision making, the planner has only one decision to make,
namely the production input quantity Q: Revenues are generated from selling the
available quantity, i.e., the minimum of production output and demand, to the end
customer. Production cost, however, is incurred for every produced unit. Thus, the
total supply chain profit is given by
PSC Qð Þ ¼ p  E min D;Y Qð Þð Þ½   c  Q: ð3Þ
The first term in (3) describes the expected revenue from selling usable units; the
second part constitutes the costs which are incurred by the respective production
quantity. For deriving the optimal decision on production input, two cases have to
be analyzed separately: QD and QD:
Case SC(I)
Under case SC(I) ðQDÞ it is obvious that YðQÞQD, due to 0 h 1:
Thus, the supply chain profit transforms to
PSC Qð Þ ¼ p  E Y Qð Þ½   c  Q ¼ p  h cð Þ  Q
Taking the first-order derivative yields
dPSC Qð Þ
dQ
¼ p  h c [ 0 for p[ c=h 0 else

For case SC(I), it follows that the supply chain produces the following quantity
QSCðIÞ ¼ D for p[ c=h0 else

: ð4Þ
If the condition for profitability of the business holds, i.e., p[ c=h, it has to be
evaluated whether an input quantity QD is preferable.
Case SC(II)
In this case ðQDÞ the supply chain profit to maximize is given in (3). In this
function the expected sales quantity of the supply chain will be denoted by L (D, Q)
and can be expressed by
3 More details of the analyses and all respective proofs can be found in a working paper version of
Clemens and Inderfurth (2014) under http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2014/2014_11.
pdf.
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L D;Qð Þ :¼ E min D; Y Qð Þð Þ½  ¼ D
ZD
0
D yð Þ  fYðQÞ yð Þdy:
Transforming this expression under the normality assumption for Y(Q) yields
L D;Qð Þ :¼ D rYðQÞ  FS zD;Q
   zD;Q þ fS zD;Q   ð5Þ
Here we define zD;Q :¼ DlYðQÞrYðQÞ . Note that zD;Q depends on demand D as well as on
production input Q through mean and standard deviation of the yield YðQÞ. Thus,
the above supply chain profit transforms to
PSC Qð Þ ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  c  Q ð6Þ
Taking the first-order derivative yields
dPSC Qð Þ
dQ
¼ p  oL D;Qð Þ
oQ
 c
¼ p  h
2




  ! c:
The second-order derivative turns out to be negative so that the profit function in
(6) is concave. Thus, we can utilize the first-order condition dPSC Qð Þ=dQ ¼! 0 to
derive the optimal input decision for case SC(II). The respective production quantity










and is denoted by QSCðIIÞ. If we define
M D;Qð Þ :¼ h
2




  ! ¼ oL D;Qð Þ
oQ
ð7Þ






Since the solution space of case SC(II) includes the solution from (4) for p[ c=h,
the overall production decision of the supply chain is given by




The corresponding optimal profit of the supply chain results from (6) and takes
the following form:
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PSC ¼ PSC Qð Þ




þ rYðQÞ  fS zD;Q
 	 	
 c  Q






Inserting rYðQÞ  fS zD;Q
 	
¼ 2  FS zD;Q
 	
 lYðQÞ  2cph  lYðQÞ which is given from
(7) and (8) and exploiting lYðQÞ ¼ h  Q yields the optimal supply chain profit
PSC ¼ p  1 FS zD;Q
 	 	





To analyze the relationship between production quantity and demand, the
derivative dQ Dð Þ=dD is evaluated. The relation between Q and D is given by
dQ Dð Þ
dD







2  lYðQÞ  lYðQÞ þ D
 	
h  lYðQÞ þ Dþ rYðQÞ
 	
lYðQÞ þ D rYðQÞ
 	 [ 0 ð11Þ
which shows that larger demand leads to larger production quantities which is
intuitive. Interestingly, the production/demand ratio ðQ=DÞ converges to a constant
the larger demand gets. Assuming that demand approaches infinity, it can be shown
that the production quantity approaches demand multiplied by 1=h: This means that
production is only inflated to compensate for expected yield losses, but no further
adjustment is made to account for the yield risk. This is reasonable as binomially







¼ 0). Generally, we can formulate the following Lemma:
Lemma If demand approaches infinity, the inflation factor of demand for the
production input, i.e., Q=D, approaches 1=h:
However, there is no unique way how the Q=D ratio is approaching 1=h as
demand grows. Rather, it depends on the value of demand, production cost, retail
price, and success probability whether the ratio is increasing from below 1=h,
decreasing from above 1=h or takes a combination of both. ‘‘Examples for the
development of the production/demand ratio’’ in Appendix shows respective
numerical examples.
4 Contract analysis for a decentralized supply chain
A decentralized supply chain consists of more than one decision maker. In our
setting, a single buyer decides on the order quantity to fill end-customer demand and
a single supplier produces to satisfy the order from the buyer as described in the
beginning. The decentralized supply chain is modelled as a Stackelberg game with
the buyer being the leader and the supplier being the follower, i.e., the buyer
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anticipates the production decision by the supplier in reaction to his order. In this
context, it is assumed that the buyer has knowledge of the supplier’s yield
distribution and production cost.
Following the above decision making process, each of the considered contract
types is analyzed in three steps. First, the supplier’s optimal production decision for a
given buyer’s order volume is analyzed. Second, the buyer’s decision is evaluated that
maximizes his profit under anticipation of the supplier’s production response. Third, it
is investigated if and under which specific conditions the interaction of buyer and
supplier is able to lead to the first-best result from the centralized supply chain so that
coordination is achieved. This three-step analysis will first be carried out for the
standard wholesale price contract before it is extended to two contracts (overpro-
duction risk sharing contract and penalty contract) which are known to coordinate the
supply chain in the case of stochastically proportional production yield.
4.1 Wholesale price contract
Under a simple wholesale price (WHP) contract the buyer orders some quantity X,
and the supplier releases a production batch Q: The output from this batch is used to
satisfy the buyer’s order to a maximum extent. Delivered units are sold to the buyer
at a per unit wholesale price w: In the context of this analysis the price w which rules
the distribution of supply chain profits is a given parameter. In the following, the
decisions made by the supplier and by the buyer are analyzed separately.
4.1.1 Supplier decision
Given the buyer’s order quantity X, the supplier maximizes the following expected
profit4:
PWHPS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   c  Q ð12Þ
The first term in (12) describes the expected revenue from selling usable units to
the buyer; the second term represents the corresponding production cost. According
to their implication for the supplier’s profit function, two cases (QX and QX)
are considered separately.
Case S(I)
Under case S(I) ðQXÞ it holds that YðQÞQX due to 0 h 1, and the
supplier faces a profit of
PWHPS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E Y Qð Þ½   c  Q ¼ w  h cð Þ  Q ð13Þ
The first-order derivative
dPWHPS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ w  h c
is positive if w[ c=h and zero or negative otherwise. This implies the following
production decision
4 The following analysis is identical to the centralized case with X instead of D and w instead of p.
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QWHPSðIÞ Xð Þ ¼




If the condition for profitability of the business holds, i.e., w[ c=h, it has to be
evaluated whether QX is preferable for the supplier.
Case S(II)
In this case ðQXÞ the supplier’s profit to maximize is the one in (12) which
after some transformation is given by
PWHPS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  L X;Qð Þ  c  Q ð15Þ
Here, we define the delivery quantity from the supplier to the buyer as
L X;Qð Þ ¼ X  rY Qð Þ  FS zX;Q
   zX;Q þ fS zX;Q   ð16Þ
and zX;Q :¼ XlYðQÞrYðQÞ : The optimal production input for case S(II) results from the
first-order condition below:
dPWHPS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ w  oL X;Qð Þ
oQ










  ! ¼ M X;Qð Þ ð17Þ
which is independent from any cost or price parameter. The optimal input







Theoretically, the supplier can choose a production quantity which is smaller
than the order quantity and generate positive profits. However, in this case the
optimization will follow case S(I), the solution of which is included in the solution
space of S(II). Summarizing, the supplier’s production decision under the simple
WHP contract is given by
QWHP Xð Þ ¼ Q
WHP




The supplier’s profit is concave as the second-order derivative is negative5:
5 The result is identical to the second-order derivative of the supply chain profit with X instead of D and
w instead of p.
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d2PWHPS Q Xjð Þ
dQ2
¼ w  oM X;Qð Þ
oQ




X þ lYðQÞ þ rYðQÞ
 	




Analogously to the centralized supply chain analysis, the relation between Q and










2  lYðQÞ  lYðQÞ þ X
 	
h  lYðQÞ þ X þ rYðQÞ
 	
lYðQÞ þ X  rYðQÞ
 	 [ 0: ð20Þ
4.1.2 Buyer decision
The buyer as the leader in this Stackelberg game anticipates the supplier’s decision
from (19). As first mover, under a simple WHP contract the buyer maximizes the
following expected profit:
PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ p  E min D;X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  ð21Þ
The first term of this profit function is the expected revenue from selling to the
end customer; the second term describes the expected cost from procuring units
from the supplier. Also for the buyer decision, depending on the order/demand
relationship (XD or XD), two cases for the profit function have to be
distinguished.
Case B(I)
Under case B(I) ðXDÞ the buyer’s profit is given by
PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ p wð Þ  E min X;Y Qð Þð Þ½  ¼ p wð Þ  L X;Qð Þ ð22Þ
The first-order derivative is rather complex as the buyer is the leader in this
Stackelberg game and accounts for the supplier’s reaction to his decision, i.e.,
Q ¼ QWHP Xð Þ: Therefore, the total first-order derivative of this function includes
the relation dQ Xð Þ=dX from (20) which describes the change in production input











 dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð23Þ
Given the partial first-order derivative oL X;Qð Þ=oX [with L X;Qð Þ from (16)] as
6 The result is identical to (11) with X instead of D.






   zX;Q  1rYðQÞ þ FS zX;Q
   1
rYðQÞ
 fS zX;Q
   zX;Q  1rYðQÞ
 
¼ 1 FS zX;Q
 
ð24Þ




¼ p wð Þ  oL X;Qð Þ
oX




 dQ Xð Þ
dX
¼ p wð Þ  oL X;Qð Þ
oQ
 dQ Xð Þ
dX
¼ p wð Þ M X;Qð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX
with oL X;Qð Þ=oQ from (17).
After inserting these terms, the total first-order derivative turns out to be
dPWHPB Xð Þ
dX
¼ p wð Þ  1 FS zX;Q
  þ p wð Þ M X;Qð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð25Þ
Due to M X;Qð Þ[ 0, dQ Xð Þ=dX[ 0, and the profitability assumption p[w it
follows that XWHP ¼ D because
dPWHPB Xð Þ
dX
[ 0 for p[w
 0 else







Analyzing the second case B(II) ðXDÞ, the buyer’s profit is given by
PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ p  E min D; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  or, equivalently,
PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  w  L X;Qð Þ: ð26Þ











 dQ Xð Þ
dX
:
The single terms can be expressed as
oPWHPB Xð Þ
oX
¼ w  oL X;Qð Þ
oX
¼ w  1 FS zX;Q
  





 dQ Xð Þ
dX
¼ p  oL D;Qð Þ
oQ
 w  oL X;Qð Þ
oQ
 
 dQ Xð Þ
dX
¼ p M D;Qð Þ  w M X;Qð Þð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX
with oL X;Qð Þ=oX from (24) and oL X;Qð Þ=oQ from (17).
Finally, the total first-order derivative is given by
dPWHPB Xð Þ
dX
¼ w  1 FS zX;Q
  þ p M D;Qð Þ  w M X;Qð Þð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð27Þ
Exploiting this derivative, the buyer decision under case B(II), denoted by XWHPBðIIÞ ,
is implicitly given from the first-order condition dPWHPB Xð Þ

dX¼! 0. Hence, as the
order decision under case B(II) includes the solution of case B(I), the overall order







4.1.3 Interaction of buyer and supplier
To evaluate the coordination ability of the WHP contract it has to be analyzed
whether a wholesale price value exists which induces the supplier to produce the
supply chain optimal quantity Q* chosen in the centralized setting. In a second step
it must be checked if a coordinating wholesale price leaves each supply chain actor
with a positive profit so that both of them have an incentive to participate in the
business.
The following analysis shows that two extreme wholesale price values (w ¼ p
and w ¼ c=h) exist which formally meet the coordination condition but violate the
participation constraints.
(I) Wholesale price w ¼ p
From the supply chain’s and the supplier’s optimality conditions in (8) and (18)
we know that c
p
¼ M D;Qð Þ and c
w
¼ M X;QWHPð Þ, respectively, if p[w[ c=h:
Coordination is achieved if QWHP ¼ Q. Obviously, this is guaranteed if the
following two conditions hold: (i) the buyer orders at demand level ðXWHP ¼ DÞ
which yields M X;QWHPð Þ ¼ M D;Qð Þ and (ii) the wholesale price is equal to the
retail price which guarantees that c=p ¼ c=w: Given w ¼ p, the effect on the buyer’s
profit has to be evaluated. Under case B(II) ðXDÞ, the first-order derivative of the
buyer profit in (27) transforms to
dPWHPB Xð Þ
dX
¼ p  1 FS zX;Q
  þ p  c
p
 p  c
p
 
 dQ Xð Þ
dX
¼ p  1 FS zX;Q
  
\0:
Thus, for all values of the buyer’s order in the range XD, his marginal profit is
negative. Consequently, the buyer will not order above end-customer demand.
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Evaluating the decision spectrum XD, the buyer profit from (22), given w ¼ p,
turns out to be zero:
PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ p pð Þ  L X;QWHP
  ¼ 0:
Because the buyer’s profit is zero for any order quantity below end-customer
demand, he is indifferent between all values from 0 to D. Assuming that the buyer
orders XWHP ¼ D units and given w ¼ p, it follows from the supply chain’s and the
supplier’s profits in (6) and (15) that
PWHPS Q
WHP XWHP ¼ D  ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  c  Q ¼ PSC Qð Þ:
Thus, the supplier receives the total supply chain profit while the buyer does not
generate any profit when ordering D units. Hence, the buyer does not agree on the
contract and the business does not take place at all. Consequently, coordination
cannot be achieved by the simple wholesale price contract if the two above
conditions hold. The buyer only participates in the business if the wholesale price is
below the retail price. However, in this case it holds that c=p\c=w and,
consequently, M X;QWHPð Þ[M D;Qð Þ: As oM X;Qð Þ=oQ\0, it follows that the
supplier’s production quantity is too low to coordinate the supply chain. Only a
wholesale price value as large as the retail price incentivizes the supplier to produce
the supply chain optimal quantity when the buyer’s order equals demand.
(II) Wholesale price w ¼ c=h
However, a low wholesale price might induce the buyer to order larger amounts
which compensate the unwillingness of the supplier to inflate the order enough to
reach the supply chain optimum. For that reason, another extreme case for the
wholesale price is evaluated.
If the supplier sells at her expected production cost to the buyer ðw ¼ c=hÞ, it is
obvious that a production quantity larger than the order quantity makes no sense.
Thus, case S(I) QX must be analyzed with the profit function from (13). Setting
w ¼ c=h yields





 Q ¼ 0:
Because the supplier’s profit is zero for all possible production choices, she is
indifferent between all values from 0 to XWHP: That being the case, it will be
assumed that the supplier produces QWHP ¼ XWHP units. Anticipating this behavior,
the buyer maximizes his profit for case B(II) XD in (26)
PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  w  L X;Qð Þ
Given QWHP ¼ XWHP, it follows that FS zX;Q
  ¼ 1 and fS zX;Q  ¼ 0. Thus, the
buyer’s profit function transforms to
PWHPB X
WHP QWHP ¼ XWHP  ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  c  Q ¼ PSC Qð Þ
because according to (5) w  L X;Qð Þ ¼ ch  L X;Qð Þ ¼ ch  Qþ ch  1  Q h  Qð Þþð
rYðQÞ  0Þ ¼ c  Q is given.
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As XWHP ¼ QWHP and PWHPB XWHP QWHP ¼ XWHPjð Þ ¼ PSC Qð Þ, it obviously
follows that XWHP ¼ Q and PWHPB XWHPð Þ ¼ PSC Qð Þ:
Thus, it can be shown that given w ¼ c=h, coordination of the supply chain could
be enabled with the buyer ordering the supply chain optimal production quantity and
the supplier producing the exact order quantity. However, as the supplier is left with
no profit, her participation constraint is violated and she does not agree on the
contract. Thus, coordination of the supply chain is impeded by violating the
supplier’s participation constraint.
Summarizing, each case violates the participation constraint of one actor in the
supply chain (PWHPB Xð Þ ¼ 0 for w ¼ p and PWHPS Q Xjð Þ ¼ 0 for w ¼ c=h) and, thus,
terminates the interaction.
4.2 Overproduction risk-sharing contract
Under the overproduction risk-sharing (ORS) contract, the risk of producing too
many units (i.e., those units which exceed the order quantity) is shared among the
two parties. Thus, the supplier bears less risk and is motivated to respond to the
buyer’s order with a higher production quantity. Under this contract, the buyer
commits to pay for all units produced by the supplier. While he pays the wholesale
price w per unit for deliveries up to his actual order volume, quantities that exceed
this amount are compensated at a lower price w0: To exclude situations where the
supplier will generate unlimited profits from overproduction the following
parameter restrictions are set: w0\c=h\w: As the supplier is able to generate
revenue for every produced unit she has an incentive to produce a larger lot
compared to the situation under the simple WHP contract. This increase might
provide the potential to align the supplier’s production decision with the supply
chain optimal one.
In this context, two contract variants have to be distinguished depending on the
way a possible overproduction is handled by the parties. Under the first variant the
buyer just financially compensates the supplier for overproduction without
physically receiving deliveries that exceed his order size. This Pull-ORS contract
leaves him in a different risk position as when the parties agree that the supplier will
deliver the whole production output irrespective of the buyer’s order. This variant is
denoted as a Push-ORS contract.
4.2.1 Supplier decision
The profit to optimize by the supplier is identical for both contract variants.
Different from the WHP profit function in (12) it includes the compensation for
overproduction and is given by
PORSS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  þ wO  E Y Qð Þ  Xð Þþ
  c  Q ð29Þ
Like in the WHP contract analysis, two cases are analyzed separately, S(I)
ðQXÞ and S(II) ðQXÞ:
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Case S(I)
From case S(I) ðQXÞ it results that YðQÞQX and the supplier’s profit
transforms to
PORSS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E Y Qð Þ½  þ wO  0 c  Q ¼ w  h cð Þ  Q ð30Þ
For the first-order derivative it holds that
dPORSS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ w  h c [ 0 for w[ c=h 0 else

From that, the optimal input decision under case S(I) is given by
QORSSðIÞ Xð Þ ¼




Consequently, it has to be evaluated whether case S(II) ðQXÞ is preferable for
the supplier.
Case S(II)
In this case, the supplier profit is given by
PORSS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  þ wO  E Y Qð Þ min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   c  Q
¼ w wOð Þ  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  þ wO  E Y Qð Þ½   c  Q
so that we can formulate
PORSS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w w0ð Þ  L X;Qð Þ þ w0  lYðQÞ  c  Q ð32Þ
with L X;Qð Þ from (16). The first-order derivative of the supplier’s profit is given by
dPORSS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ w w0ð Þ  oL X;Qð ÞoQ þ w0  h c
¼ w w0ð Þ M X;Qð Þ þ w0  h c ð33Þ
with oL X;Qð Þ=oQ from (17). The supplier’s production quantity under case S(II),
QORS
SðIIÞ, results from the first-order condition dP
ORS
S Q Xjð Þ

dQ¼! 0 and is implicitly
given from:
c w0  h





Thus, the supplier’s production decision under an ORS contract can be
formulated as
QORS Xð Þ ¼ Q
ORS




Note that for wO ¼ 0 the optimal decision is identical to that under a WHP
contract.
The supplier’s profit is concave as the second-order derivative is negative:
316 Business Research (2015) 8:301–332
123
d2PORSS Q Xjð Þ
dQ2
¼ w w0ð Þ  oM X;Qð ÞoQ
¼ fS zX;Q
   w w0ð Þ  h2
4

X þ lYðQÞ þ rYðQÞ
 	




Since M X;Qð Þ in (34) is a constant like for the WHP contract, the first-order
derivative dQORS Xð ÞdX is identical to that in (20).
4.2.2 Buyer decision
The buyer’s profit function depends on the specific type of ORS contract that is
applied. Under a Pull-ORS type (exclusion of over-delivery) the buyer maximizes a
profit which compared to the WHP contract is reduced by the supplier’s
compensation for overproduced items




As for the supplier, the buyer analysis treats two separate cases.
Case B(I)
Under case B(I) ðXDÞ, the buyer’s profit is given by
PORSB Xð Þ ¼ p wð Þ  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w0  E Y Qð Þ  Xð Þþ
 
¼ p wþ w0ð Þ  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w0  E Y Qð Þ½ 
which delivers
PORSB Xð Þ ¼ p wþ w0ð Þ  L X;Qð Þ  w0  lYðQÞ ð37Þ
The total first-order derivative of (37) is given by
dPORSB Xð Þ
dX
¼ p wþ w0ð Þ  1 FS zX;Q
  þ p wþ w0ð Þ M X;Qð Þ  w0  hð Þ
 dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð38Þ
with M X;Qð Þ from (17) and dQ Xð Þ=dX from (20). Depending on whether the first-
order derivative is positive or negative, the order quantity under case B(I), XORSBðIÞ ,
ranges from zero up to demand D.
Case B(II)
For case B(II) ðXDÞ the buyer maximizes the following profit
PORSB Xð Þ ¼ p  E min D; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w w0ð Þ  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w0  E Y Qð Þ½ 
that equals
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PORSB Xð Þ ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  w w0ð Þ  L X;Qð Þ  w0  lYðQÞ ð39Þ
with L D;Qð Þ from (5) and L X;Qð Þ from (16). The profit maximizing order quantity
for case B(II), XORS
BðIIÞ, results from the first-order derivative below
dPORSB Xð Þ
dX
¼  w w0ð Þ  1 FS zX;Q
  
þ p M D;Qð Þ  w w0ð Þ M X;Qð Þ  w0  hð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð40Þ




4.2.3 Interaction of buyer and supplier
Under the extended contract with two parameters w and w0 it has to be analyzed
whether there exists a combination of contract parameters which guarantees that the
total supply chain profit is maximized while both, supplier and buyer, accept the
contract. Coordination is achieved if the optimality conditions of supply chain and




¼ M D;Qð Þ and c w0  h




This condition is fulfilled if (i) the buyer orders at demand level, i.e., if XORS ¼ D
and (ii) M D;Qð Þ ¼ M X;QORSð Þ holds, i.e., if the following condition for the
contract parameters is satisfied
c  w w0ð Þ ¼ p  c w0  hð Þ ð41Þ
which ensures that c=p ¼ c w0  hð Þ= w w0ð Þ: This condition also implies that
p ¼ w w0ð Þ  c= c w0  hð Þ[w w0:
For this parameter setting the supplier’s marginal profit under case S(II) in (33)
turns out to be
dPORSS Q
ORS ¼ Q XORS ¼ D 
dQ
¼ w w0ð Þ  c w0  hð Þ
w w0ð Þ þ w0  h c ¼ 0:
The supplier’s marginal profit being zero, shows that the supplier actually
chooses the respective quantity. As the buyer anticipates this behavior, it can be
evaluated which order decision maximizes the buyer’s profit. Under case B(II)
ðXDÞ, for QORS ¼ Q the buyer’s marginal profit from (40) transforms to




¼  w w0ð Þ  1 FSðzX;QÞ
 
þ p  c
p
 w w0ð Þ  c w0  h
w w0ð Þ
 
 w0  h
 
 dQ Xð Þ
dX
¼  w w0ð Þ  1 FSðzX;QÞ
 þ c cð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX




Due to the first-order derivative being negative, the buyer will not order above
demand. Assuming an order quantity of XORS ¼ D and the coordinating parameter
setting from (41), the buyer maximizes the profit under case B(I) ðXDÞ in (37)
according to
PORSB X
ORS ¼ D  ¼ p wþ w0ð Þ  L D;Qð Þ  w0  lYðQÞ:
Rearranging the above profit yields:
PORSB X
ORS ¼D ¼ p L D;Qð Þ c Q þ c Q  ww0ð Þ L D;Qð Þw0  h Q
¼PSC ww0ð Þ L D;Qð Þþ cw0  hð Þ Q
¼PSC ww0ð Þ L D;Qð Þþ
c
p




ORS ¼ D  ¼ PSC  1 w w0p
 
: ð42Þ
Due to (41) it holds that p[w w0 and thus, PORSB XORS ¼ Dð Þ[ 0: Utilizing
the first-order condition of the above profit, the optimal order quantity is
determined. The relation in (42) allows us to conclude that dPORSB Xð Þ

dX[ 0
since dPSC Xð Þ

dX[ 0 (with PSC Xð Þ ¼ PSC for D ¼ X) and thus, XORS ¼ D:
So, both conditions for coordination are fulfilled which proves that the Pull-ORS
contract can enable supply chain coordination, because the buyer incentivizes the
supplier to produce the supply chain optimal amount by ordering at demand level if
the contract parameters are fixed appropriately, i.e., according to (41).
If the actors agree on a Push-ORS contract the situation changes. In case all
produced items are physically delivered, the buyer’s sales are not restricted by his
own order and his profit turns out to be identical for the cases B(I) and B(II), i.e., for
XD and XD, and is given from (39):
PORSB Xð Þ ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  w w0ð Þ  L X;Qð Þ  w0  lYðQÞ:
From the previous analysis of the interaction between supplier and buyer, it is
given that coordination requests XORS ¼ D and c  w w0ð Þ ¼ p  c w0  hð Þ:
These conditions result in the following marginal profit for the buyer:
dPORSB Xð Þ
dX
¼ ww0ð Þ  1FS zX;Q
  þ p  c
p
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As the buyer’s marginal profit is negative (given w0\w), it is no option for the
buyer to order at demand level. Through the design of the contract, orders below
demand may be optimal. As the delivered quantity can exceed the order or even
end-customer demand, the buyer can still meet demand by ‘under-ordering’.
Assuming the buyer orders below demand, there may be combinations of w and w0
which incentivize the supplier to produce the supply chain optimal quantity
(obviously, a larger wholesale price or a higher compensation for overstock is
necessary). However, higher prices are less profitable for the buyer who would
further reduce his order quantity. This downward trend continues until nothing is
ordered at all. Thus, the Push-ORS contract cannot coordinate the supply chain.
4.3 Penalty contract
If a penalty (PEN) contract is applied the supplier will bear a higher risk than under
a simple WHP contract since she is punished for under-delivery. The supplier is
penalized by the buyer (in the amount of p) for each unit ordered that cannot be
delivered because of insufficient production yield. Given the potential penalty the
supplier has an incentive to produce more than under the simple WHP contract
which might be sufficient to achieve coordination of the supply chain.
4.3.1 Supplier decision
Under the PEN contract, the profit to optimize by the supplier includes the revenue
from product delivery as well as a penalty for under-delivery and is given by
PPENS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   p  E X  Y Qð Þð Þþ
  c  Q: ð43Þ
In the following, the two cases S(I) ðQXÞ and S(II) ðQXÞ are, again,
analyzed separately.
Case S(I)
Given case S(I) ðQXÞ the supplier’s profit simplifies to
PPENS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E Y Qð Þ½   p  X  E Y Qð Þ½ ð Þ  c  Q
¼ wþ pð Þ  h cð Þ  Q p  X ð44Þ
From the first-order derivative of (44) which is given by
dPPENS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ wþ pð Þ  h c
it follows that the supplier produces either zero or the ordered amount depending on
the parameter constellation as formulated below
dPPENS Q Xjð Þ
dQ




Note that if Q ¼ X, then PPENS Q Xjð Þ ¼ wþ pð Þ  h c pð Þ  X which consti-
tutes the parameter condition above. Finally, the production quantity under case
S(I), QPENSðIÞ , is formulated as follows
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Assuming that wþ p[ cþ pð Þ=h holds, case S(II) ðQXÞ has to be evaluated.
The profit generated by the supplier is according to (43)
PPENS Q Xjð Þ ¼ w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   p  E X min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   c  Q
and can be expressed as
PPENS Q Xjð Þ ¼ wþ pð Þ  L X;Qð Þ  p  X  c  Q: ð46Þ
Taking the first-order derivative yields
dPPENS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ wþ pð Þ  oL X;Qð Þ
oQ
 c ¼ wþ pð Þ M X;Qð Þ  c ð47Þ
with oL X;Qð Þ=oQ from (17). Hence, from dPPENS Q Xjð Þ

dQ¼! 0 the optimal pro-
duction input under case S(II), QPENSðIIÞ, satisfies the following equation
c





Hence, the supplier’s production policy under a PEN contract is the following






Note that for p ¼ 0 the optimal decision is identical to that under a WHP
contract.
The supplier’s profit is concave as the second-order derivative is negative:
d2PPENS Q Xjð Þ
dQ2
¼ wþ pð Þ  oM X;Qð Þ
oQ
¼ fS zX;Q
   wþ pð Þ  h2
4

X þ lYðQÞ þ rYðQÞ
 	




Since M X;Qð Þ in (48) is a constant like for the WHP contract, the first-order
derivative dQPEN Xð Þ=dX is identical to that in (20).
4.3.2 Buyer decision
The buyer under a PEN contract is compensated for missing units by the penalty
rate. The profit the buyer generates is the following
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PPENB Xð Þ ¼ p  E min D;X; Y Qð Þð Þ½   w  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  þ p  E X  Y Qð Þð Þþ
 
:
The two cases B(I) ðXDÞ and B(II) ðXDÞ are evaluated in the next section.
Case B(I)
The buyer’s profit in case B(I) ðXDÞ transforms to
PPENB Xð Þ ¼ p wð Þ  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  þ p  E X  Y Qð Þð Þþ
 
¼ p w pð Þ  E min X; Y Qð Þð Þ½  þ p  X
PPENB Xð Þ ¼ p w pð Þ  L X;Qð Þ þ p  X ð50Þ
with L X;Qð Þ from (16). Taking the first-order derivative yields the expression below
dPPENB Xð Þ
dX
¼ p w pð Þ  1 FS zX;Q
  þ pþ p w pð Þ M X;Qð Þ  dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð51Þ
with M X;Qð Þ from (17) and dQ Xð Þ=dX from (20). The optimal order quantity under




dX¼! 0: However, also the case XD
has to be analyzed.
Case B(II)
Under case B(II), i.e., XD, the buyer maximizes the subsequent profit
PPENB Xð Þ ¼ p  E min D; YðQÞð Þ½   wþ pð Þ  E min X; YðQÞð Þ½  þ p  X that equals
PPENB Xð Þ ¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  wþ pð Þ  L X;Qð Þ þ p  X ð52Þ
with L D;Qð Þ from (5) and L X;Qð Þ from (16). The buyer’s optimal decision under
case B(II), XPENBðIIÞ, is derived from exploiting the first-order condition
dPPENB Xð Þ

dX¼! 0 concerning the derivative below
dPPENB Xð Þ
dX
¼  wþ pð Þ  1 FS zX;Q
  þ pþ p M D;Qð Þ  wþ pð Þ M X;Qð Þð Þ
 dQ Xð Þ
dX
ð53Þ
with M D;Qð Þ from (7), M X;Qð Þ from (17) and dQ Xð Þ=dX from (20).
4.3.3 Interaction of buyer and supplier
As under the ORS contract, it has to be analyzed whether there exists a combination
of contract parameters which guarantees that total supply chain profit is maximized
while both, supplier and buyer, accept the contract. To coordinate the supply chain,
the optimality conditions of supply chain and supplier under a PEN contract have to
be identical. They are given from (8) and (48), respectively:
c
p
¼ M D;Qð Þ








This condition is fulfilled if the buyer orders at demand level, i.e., if XPEN ¼ D
and if M D;Qð Þ ¼ M X;QPENð Þ, i.e., if the following condition for the contract
parameters is satisfied
p ¼ wþ p ð54Þ
which ensures that c=p ¼ c= wþ pð Þ: Given the parameter condition, the supplier’s
marginal profit in (47) turns out to be zero:
dPPENS Q Xjð Þ
dQ
¼ wþ pð Þ  c
wþ p c ¼ 0:
As the supplier’s marginal profit is zero, she actually chooses the corresponding
input quantity. Because the buyer anticipates this behavior, it can be evaluated
which order decision maximizes his profit. Under case B(II) ðXDÞ, the buyer’s




¼  wþ pð Þ  1 FS zX;Q
  þ p
þ wþ pð Þ  c









¼ wþ wþ pð Þ  FS zX;Q
 
: ð55Þ
For proving that dPPENB Xð Þ

dX\0, it will be shown that the penalty p must not
be too large. Thus, the determination of the penalty needs particular analysis. Under
coordination (given p ¼ wþ p and XPEN ¼ D which leads to QPEN ¼ Q), and using
the supply chain profit from (6), the supplier’s and the buyer’s profits from (46) and
(52) can be expressed as follows
PPENS Q
PEN XPEN ¼ D  ¼ wþ pð Þ  L D;QPEN  p  D c  QPEN
¼ p  L D;Qð Þ  c  Q  p  D ¼ PSC Qð Þ  p  D
and
PPENB X
PEN ¼ D  ¼ p  D:
Consequently, for the supplier’s participation constraint to hold, i.e., to generate a
non-negative profit, the maximum penalty pþ that results in PPENS Q
PEN XPEN ¼jð
D:Þ ¼ 0, is given by
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From PSC Qð Þ ¼ p  1 FS zD;Q
 	 	




 Q in (10)
we get:
p\pþ ¼ p  1 FS zD;Q
 	 	








Given the coordinating parameter constellation p ¼ wþ p, the restriction p\pþ
transforms to
p\ wþ pð Þ  1 FS zD;Q
 	 	








From that we further get
wþ wþ pð Þ  FS zD;Q
 	












¼ wþ wþ pð Þ  FS zX;Q
 
\0:
According to (57) this holds if p  h  FS zD;Q
 	
 c[ 0:












so that p  h  FS zD;Q
 	








Thus, if the participation constraint for the supplier is fulfilled and if the penalty
p is restricted to be lower that pþ, the buyer’s optimal order quantity will be
XPEN ¼ D in case B(II). Since for XD the first-order derivative in (53) reduces to
dPPENB Xð Þ

dX ¼ p[ 0 the contract coordinating parameter condition p ¼ wþ p
also initiates XPEN ¼ D in case B(I). Thus, analogously to the ORS contract, the
PEN contract can enable supply chain coordination because the buyer incentivizes
the supplier to produce the supply chain optimal amount by ordering at demand
level while the contract parameters are fixed appropriately, i.e., under p ¼ wþ p:
5 Conclusion and outlook
The analyses in this paper are the first that address the problem of coordination
through contracts in supply chains with binomially distributed production yield.
They reveal several interesting insights for a buyer–supplier chain with determin-
istic end-customer demand. The simple WHP contract fails to coordinate, while
more sophisticated contracts with reward or penalty scheme enable coordinated
behavior in the supply chain without violating the actors’ participation constraints.
However, the ORS contract’s ability to coordinate a supply chain depends on the
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variant that is applied. If a Pull-type contract (without the delivery of excess units)
is used, coordination can be achieved. However, if physical delivery of overstock is
allowed (Push variant), the contract loses its coordination power. For the PEN
contract, however, it can be shown that the design enables SC coordination and,
depending on the parameter setting (including a maximum penalty restriction),
guarantees an arbitrary profit split.
A comparison with the results from Inderfurth and Clemens (2014) obtained for
stochastically proportional yields reveals that all contract designs retain their ability
or disability to trigger coordination. For the coordinating contract types, Pull-ORS
and PEN, it furthermore turns out that coordination is always coupled with a buyer’s
order at demand level. It is also interesting to see that the contract parameter setting
which is necessary to coordinate the supply chain under both contract types, i.e.,
ðw;w0Þ in (41) and ðw; pÞ in (54), is exactly the same as in the case of stochastically
proportional yield. So it becomes evident that the general coordination properties of
the studied contracts, including the ability of profit split, do not differ between the
different yield types although under binomial yield, different from stochastically
proportional yield, the level of the yield uncertainty is critically dependent on the
size of the production batch. This property, however, will in first line affect the size
of the production and order decision.
Regarding the production quantity, it is found in this paper that demand is inflated
to some extent to cope with yield losses. The respective inflation factor, however, is
not a constant multiplier of demand like in the case of stochastically proportional
yield (see Inderfurth and Clemens 2014). Instead, depending on the cost, price and
yield data this inflation factor might increase or decrease with increasing demand
level and approaches the reciprocal of the expected yield rate when demand tends to
become very large. This is due to the characteristic of binomial yields to
monotonically decrease the output risk as the production input level rises up to a
level where this risk almost vanishes. The consequences are twofold. First, under
comparable parameter settings and identical demand the production level under
binomial yield is lower and the expected supply chain profit is higher than in the case
of stochastically proportional yield. Second, in high-demand environments the
coordination deficit of the simple WHP contract becomes negligible because the
yield risk almost disappears in case of binomial yield so that the production decisions
in the centralized and decentralized supply chain setting tend to coincide. This is
completely different from what is valid under stochastically proportional yield.
The contract analysis for the case of binomial production yield in this paper also
permits to study the effects of yield misspecification in the sense that it is assumed
that the yield is stochastically proportional, but the real underlying model is
binomial. A respective numerical study has been carried out for both settings, the
centralized and decentralized one (see ‘‘ Effects of yield misspecification if real yield
is binomial’’ and ‘‘Effects of yield misspecification if real yield is stochastically
proportional’’ in Appendices). In this study the production and order decisions under
the wrong yield assumption are inserted in the profit function with correct yield
specification with yield parameters that are identical for both yield models. In the
centralized case it turns out that a major profit loss of more than 30 % can emerge
from such a misspecification, especially if the profitability in terms of price/cost ratio
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is very small as can be verified in ‘‘Effects of yield misspecification if real yield is
binomial’’ in Appendix. In the case of decentralized decision making under a WHP
contract, however, the profit loss for the whole supply chain is in general smaller. In
some specific cases the supply chain can even profit from yield misspecification since
the wrong buyer’s order and supplier’s reaction can improve the total supply chain
performance. ‘‘Effects of yield misspecification if real yield is stochastically
proportional’’ in Appendix reveals that the same qualitative outcome (with different
quantitative results) is found in the case of a reverse misspecification, i.e., if binomial
yield is assumed but the real yield is stochastically proportional. The lesson that can
be learnt from this specific investigation is that it is very important to specify the
yield type correctly. It would be highly interesting to find out if one can distinguish
data settings where it really matters to use the true yield model. Such a study,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper and will be a matter of future research.
Additionally, further research should focus on extending the supply chain to an
emergency option for procuring extra units in case of under-delivery. This option
was introduced by Inderfurth and Clemens (2014) and it was shown to coordinate
the supply chain by applying the WHP contract. This, however, only holds if the
supplier, and not the buyer, is able to utilize the emergency source. In the current
setting, this option might reveal a similar performance. Besides, the setting can also
be adjusted with respect to supply chain structure. An important aspect in this
context is the extension from a serial to a converging supply chain. Another
interesting extension of the current work would lie in a contract analysis for an
environment where demand is also random. From research in the case of
stochastically proportional yield (see Yan and Liu 2009) we know that the simple
contracts considered in this paper cannot guarantee coordination while more
complex ones might do so. It is an open question, however, if these results also hold
under binomially distributed yields.
Concentrating on further types of yield uncertainty, the all-or-nothing type of
yield realization, also known as disruption risk (see Xia et al. 2011), has hardly
received any attention in literature so far. The same holds for additional yield types
mentioned in Yano and Lee (1995), like interrupted geometric yield or yield
uncertainty from random capacity. Furthermore, it would be a challenging task to
study how contracts can be used for supply chain coordination in planning
environments with multiple productions runs that are addressed in Grosfeld-Nir and
Gerchak (2004).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to theCreativeCommons license, and indicate if changesweremade.
Appendix
Examples for the development of the production/demand ratio
Figure 2 illustrates three exemplary curves for the Q=D-ratio with increasing
demand.
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It is evident from the different curves that there is no monotony in the Q=D-ratio.
Yet, the results in (a) and (b) are comparable with typical newsvendor settings
where the critical ratio (here it is given by c=p) determines whether optimal
production quantities are below or above expected demand (which corresponds to
Fig. 2 Three exemplary developments for production input/demand ratio for 50 % success probability
which approaches 1=h
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Fig. 3 Extraction from Fig. 2 part (c)
Fig. 4 Critical parameter ratio (c=p) which guarantees a Q=D ratio of 1=h
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production yield in our setting). The major difference is that, in addition to prices
and costs, also demand has an influence on the production decision as the
production risk decreases with increasing quantity. A high margin [as in (a)] causes
Q=D ratios above 1=h while low margins [compare (b)] lead to production inputs
below the expected yield. Yet, the shape of the curve in (c) is quite interesting. The
changes in Q=D are minor with increasing demand, however, at one point the curve
intersects with 1=h (which is at D ¼ 50). For illustrative purpose, the segment
0D 1000 from curve (c) is extracted in Fig. 3.
The intersection with 1=h raises the question whether there exist parameter
combinations which always guarantee an inflation of demand in the amount of 1=h:
Figure 4 part (a) answers this question by illustrating the c=p ratio which results in
Q=D ¼ 1=h for increasing demand.
Part (b) of the above figure extracts the range 0D 1000 from part (a).
Comparing this illustration with Fig. 3, the point Q=D ¼ 1=h at D ¼ 50 corresponds
to the starting point of the curve in Fig. 4b which is at c=p ¼ 1=4:17 ¼ 0:24:
Effects of yield misspecification if real yield is binomial
For presenting numerical examples we set the parameters as follows: c ¼ 1, p ¼ 14
and D ¼ 100: The binomially distributed yield is approximated by the normal
distribution with mean and standard deviation from (1) and (2). For QD ¼ 100
this approximation is feasible for 0:06 h 0:94 because for these values the
condition Q  h  1 hð Þ[ 5 is satisfied. In the following Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4,
miscalculated decision variables and the respective profits are indicated by the
superscript mis.
Table 1 Supply chain decisions and profit deviations (in %) for changing retails prices under cen-
tralized decision making for 50 % success probability
p Qmis Q PmisSC P

SC DPSC (%)
2 100 100 0 0 0.00
3 122 194 61 92 33.73
4 141 200 141 189 25.06
5 158 203 237 286 17.14
6 173 205 346 384 9.95
7 187 208 463 483 4.05
8 200 209 577 582 0.72
9 212 211 680 681 0.02
10 224 212 775 780 0.65
11 235 213 865 879 1.56
12 245 214 955 978 2.36
13 255 214 1045 1077 3.00
14 265 215 1135 1177 3.52
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Effects of yield misspecification if real yield is stochastically proportional
Table 2 Supply chain decisions and profit deviations (in %) for changing wholesale prices under
decentralized decision making for 50 % success probability






2 265 265 215 215 1135 1177 3.52
3 220 179 211 109 1176 1176 0.00
4 196 138 207 104 1148 1173 2.11
5 180 114 205 101 1077 1170 7.97
6 173 100 205 100 1039 1171 1.30
7 187 100 208 100 1114 1173 5.07
8 200 100 209 100 1161 1175 1.20
9 212 100 211 100 1176 1175 -0.07
10 224 100 212 100 1174 1176 0.19
11 235 100 213 100 1165 1176 0.97
12 245 100 214 100 1155 1177 1.84
13 255 100 214 100 1145 1177 2.70
14 265 100 215 100 1135 1177 3.52
Table 3 Supply chain decisions and profit deviations (in %) for changing retail prices under centralized
decision making for a mean yield rate of 0.5
p Qmis Q PmisSC P

SC DPSC (%)
2 100 100 0 0 0.00
3 194 122 29 55 47.68
4 200 141 100 117 14.43
5 203 158 174 184 5.42
6 205 173 249 254 1.99
7 208 187 324 326 0.64
8 209 200 400 400 0.09
9 211 212 476 476 0.00
10 212 224 552 553 0.12
11 213 235 629 631 0.35
12 214 245 706 710 0.65
13 214 255 782 790 0.97
14 215 265 859 871 1.31
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